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I. INTRODUCTION
Few would dispute that the constitutional relationship
between the federal government and the states occupied a central
place on the Supreme Court's docket during the tenure of
William Rehnquist as Chief Justice. In a series of highly
publicized decisions, the Rehnquist Court reinvigorated several
federalism-based doctrines that constrain the national
government, narrowing the breadth of Congress's legislative
powers and expanding the states' immunity from federal
regulation and from suits for damages. In terms of practical
consequences, these decisions may have been more symbolic'
than revolutionary,2 but the Court clearly revived the salience of
federalism as a principle of constitutional law.
1. Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1321 (1999)
("Scrutiny of the recent decisions reveals them to be largely symbolic bows to a federalism
myth rather than real limitations on federal power."); see also Douglas Laycock,
Protecting Liberty in a Federal System: The US Experience, in PATTERNS OF REGIONALISM
AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK 119, 140 (Jorg Fedtke & B. S. Markesinis eds.,
2005); Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the Federal Courts, 574
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 142 (2001) (concluding that the Court's recent
pro-federalism decisions have "only modestly trimmed congressional power"); Jim Chen,
Filburn's Forgotten Footnote-Of Farm Team Federalism and Its Fate, 82 MINN. L. REV.
249, 254 (1997); Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who's Afraid of the Eleventh
Amendment? The Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 213, 213-15 (2006); Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal
Government? State Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (2003) (reviewing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE
NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002)). As Roderick Hills
has succinctly summarized it, "Revolution, Schmevolution." Roderick M. Hills, Jr. &
Roger Pilon, Debate Club: The End of States' Rights?, LEGAL AFF., July 18, 2007,
http://legalaffairs.orgwebexclusive/debateclub-fedrevO705.msp#Friday. Hills goes on to
write that the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions imposed an "extremely modest
brake on the centripetal tendencies of American constitutional law," and that "[flrom the
outset, the Court made it perfectly clear to anyone who bothered to listen that its
ambitions for trimming back on national powers were modest and largely apolitical." Id.
2. A June 2007 search in the Westlaw Journals and Law Reviews database (JLR)
found eighty-five documents using the terms "Rehnquist Court" and "federalism
revolution" in the same paragraph. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the
Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 618 (2003)
(highlighting Congress's power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment as a "pillar[] of the
federalism revolution of the second Rehnquist Court"); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our
Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1690 (2004) (questioning whether the
federal judiciary can regulate the structural boundaries between Congress and the
states). The New York Times has used the term "federalism revolution" over thirty-five
times since June 2000. N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.coml (displaying the results of
searching "NYT Archive Since 1981" for "federalism revolution") (last visited July 13,
2007). See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Court Hears Its First Case in Federalism
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at A21 (opining that the Roberts Court is now faced
with "the unfinished business of the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution"); Jeffrey
Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 3, 2001, at 32, 34 (stating that the
"federalism revolution ... may be the Rehnquist court's most distinctive legacy").
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By most accounts, Justice O'Connor played a vital role in
this "federalism revival." Drawing on her experience as a state
judge and legislator in Arizona,3 the story goes, O'Connor's
decisionmaking emphasized the importance of independent state
sovereignty within our constitutional system. She was a
consistent member of the five-justice majority that invalidated
federal legislation as beyond Congress's commerce power;4 that
circumscribed Congress's authority to enact legislation under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment; 5 that struck down
federal legislation directing the states to regulate in specific
ways;' and that narrowed Congress's capacity to expose the
states to suits for damages when they violate federal law.' And
some of O'Connor's more notable opinions-for instance, her
majority opinions in Gregory v. Ashcroft8 and New York v. United
States9 and her dissents in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority"° and South Dakota v. Dole"-exalted the
importance of preserving the prerogatives of state governments
as a counterweight to federal power.
Much of this storyline rings true. But there is more to
federalism than the limits on Congress's enumerated powers.
The Constitution also places structural limits on state power that
are designed to protect the interests of the nation as a whole.
And in cases implicating these "union-preserving" provisions"-
3. PETER HUBER, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 38, 45 (1990).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995).
5. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27. But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment is limited to enforcement).
6. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
7. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding that the ADEA legislation's abrogration of
states' sovereign immunity is unconstitutional); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759-60
(1999); Coll. Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
691 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
8. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (ruling that the Missouri State
Constitution did not violate the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
9. New York, 505 U.S. at 176-77 (declaring that the "take title" provision exceeded
Congress's power and was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment).
10. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588-89 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that state autonomy must be a consideration of the
Court when evaluating Congress's power to regulate the states).
11. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Congress overreached the boundaries of the Spending Clause by imposing a
national minimum drinking age).
12. I borrow the term "union-preserving" from 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-1 (3d ed. 2000).
2007] 509
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the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, the Import-Export Clause, the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity, and, most significantly, the
doctrine of preemption-O'Connor's voting record lacked a
similar dedication to protecting the states' policymaking
autonomy. In these cases, she essentially voted no differently
than the average justice with whom she served.
This Article presents a statistical study of Justice O'Connor's
voting record in the full universe of federalism decisions during
her tenure on the Court, demonstrating that her approach to
federalism was more complicated than most observers have
appreciated. The study suggests that O'Connor's reputation as an
ardent proponent of state autonomy needs to be tempered, for it
is only accurate with respect to disputes about the powers of the
national government. If we expand our definition of federalism to
include those disputes that involved the Constitution's structural
limits on state power, O'Connor's dedication to state autonomy
seems relatively tepid. In fact, an equally prominent theme-
especially during her last eleven full terms on the Court-is that
she tended to disfavor government regulation of any sort,
whether it emanated from Congress or the states.
This is not to say that Justice O'Connor's voting behavior
was normatively or jurisprudentially inconsistent; there may
well have been principled, legal justifications for favoring state
policymaking autonomy in one context but not the other. Nor is it
to suggest that she consciously used the faqade of federalism to
accommodate a political preference for less regulation. There is
no reason to believe that she did not subscribe to the rationales
expressed in her opinions or those that she joined, and,
regardless, the nature of human decisionmaking is such that the
"true" reasons for a decision are usually unknowable, especially
to the decisionmaker herself.13 Rather, the point is strictly
descriptive: in the full universe of decisions involving the
constitutional boundaries between federal and state power,
O'Connor was comparatively protective of state autonomy only in
cases addressing the limits on national authority.
13. See ZIvA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 3 (1999)
(describing how people tend to arrive at decisions that they are motivated to reach while
being unaware of that motivation's influence); Mahzarin R. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice,
14 PSYCHOL. Sci. AGENDA 8, 8 (2001) ("Consciousness... permits a view of who we are
and what we are capable of that is independent of the knowledge and feelings that may
drive beliefs, attitudes, and behavior."); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 25-34
(2004) (reviewing literature on how human beings are largely unaware of the many
influences on their decisionmaking).
510 [44:3
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II briefly describes
the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival and Justice O'Connor's
role in that project. Part III explains that, given the breadth of
Congress's modern regulatory authority, the latitude afforded
state governments in areas of concurrent federal and state
jurisdiction may actually be more important to the values of
federalism than enforcing the outer limits of congressional
power. Thus, to gain a complete understanding of a justice's
attitude towards constitutional federalism, we need to review
those cases implicating the structural provisions that constrain
the states, not just those involving the limits on the national
government. Part IV summarizes Justice O'Connor's voting
record in the entire universe of federalism cases, so defined,
comparing her votes to those of the justices with whom she
served. Finally, Part V offers some observations about the study's
results. Most interestingly, they show that O'Connor voted to
limit regulation as frequently as she voted to enhance state
autonomy. In other words, across the full run of federalism cases,
O'Connor was as much a proponent of reducing government
regulation as she was of enhancing state autonomy.
II. THE FEDERALISM "REVIVAL"
This much is not news: the Rehnquist Court reshaped the
constitutional rules governing the respective roles of the national
government and the states in our federal republic. 4 The Court
14. The thoughtful and perceptive commentary on the Rehnquist Court's federalism
jurisprudence is far too voluminous to cite in its entirety. Here is just a sampling: LARRY
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005); Matthew D. Adler &
Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York Printz, and Yeskey, 1998
SUP. CT. REV. 71 (exploring the absolute lines of impermissible encroachment under the
Tenth Amendment, as interpreted by the Rehnquist Court); Vikram David Amar, The
New "New Federalism": The Supreme Court in Hibbs (and Guillen), 6 GREEN BAG 349
(2003) (reviewing the Supreme Court's federalism-related decisions of 2003); Jack M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court's interference with vote counting in Florida
during the 2000 presidential election); Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends
Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001) (suggesting that the
congruence and proportionality test, articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland, is unjustified);
Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001)
(surveying decisions of the Rehnquist Court and concluding that recent limitations of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and Section Five have been based on faulty
logic); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's
preemption of state law and the tension those decisions have with federalism values);
David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92
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articulated a new and arguably narrower standard for evaluating
whether a federal statute falls within Congress's commerce
power. 5 It developed a fairly restrictive understanding of the
breadth of Congress's legislative authority under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring that such legislation be
IOWA L. REV. 41 (2006) (describing the Rehnquist Court's use of facial review rather than
as-applied review of the constitutionality of statute); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith,
Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An
Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002) (criticizing the "methodology of the
new federalism cases"); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on
Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225 (2001) (describing how the Court's federalism
may, inadvertently, have the effect of preventing state agencies from using federal
mandates to spend beyond the state agency's appropriation); Samuel Issacharoff &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006)
(explaining that recent Supreme Court decisions preempting state power serve to
maintain a uniform national market and prevent one state from exacting costs on
neighbor states); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998) (outlining alternative methods of judicial
review that better serve the federalism goals of the Rehnquist Court); Pamela S. Karlan,
The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and Section 1983,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (2001) (observing that the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence may actually constrain state action rather than increase state autonomy);
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 125
(1995) (discussing whether the shift from a textualist to an originalist account in Lopez is
justified); John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002) (categorizing the Rehnquist
Court's jurisprudence as one of decentralized ordering); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme
Court's Judicial Passivity, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 343 (Dennis J. Hutchinson,
David A. Strauss, & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2003); Merrill, supra note 2 (indicating how
the second Rehnquist Court focused on constitutional federalism, rather than social
issues); J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court and the Political
Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233 (2004) (highlighting the rationale behind
the Court's "revival of federalism" and the ensuing controversy); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003) (theorizing that the
enforcement model of judicial interpretation unduly limits congressional power to
legislate constitutional issues); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal
Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554
(1995) (agreeing with the Rehnquist Court's result in Lopez, but criticizing the opinion as
poorly reasoned); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J.
1141 (2002) (suggesting that the Rehnquist Court's federalism cases have more to do with
an "anti-discrimination agenda" than with federalism); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005) (proposing a federalism
doctrine that emphasizes interaction between the national and state governments as a
superior model to the Rehnquist Court's formal restrictions); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1995)
(interpreting Term Limits to be a preview of the Rehnquist Court's formalist approach to
federalism); Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's
Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001) (explaining the Rehnquist Court's
"federalism offensive"); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (2004) (comparing two competing views of federalism on the Rehnquist Court
and proposing a "strong autonomy" model that combines elements of both views).
15. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating the civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 561-62 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
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"congruent and proportional" to the constitutional violations that
Congress seeks to remedy or prevent." It minted the so-called
"anticommandeering" principle, which prohibits Congress from
directing the states to enact or implement particular regulation. 7
It held that Congress cannot use its Article I powers to enact
legislation subjecting the states to suits for damages,"8 overruling
the relatively recent precedent of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas.9
Further, the Court extended this principle of sovereign immunity
to suits brought in any court, whether state or federal," as well
as to adjudicative proceedings before federal administrative
agencies.2' Some have argued that, despite the considerable
16. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997)
(invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
17. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997) (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (White, J., dissenting) (commenting on the
"anticommandeering" principle set forth in the Court's opinion)).
18. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
19. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989) (ruling that CERCLA
allows the states to be sued in federal courts and noting that Congress can subject the
states to liability when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
20. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757-60 (1999) (holding that Congress lacked
the authority to subject the states to private, unconsenting suits for damages in state
court under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
21. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002). Perhaps as
notably, in fashioning these doctrinal innovations, the Court has asserted itself as the
ultimate arbiter of questions concerning the breadth of Congress's power vis-A-vis the
states, invalidating national legislation on federalism grounds at a rate unseen in several
generations. See, e.g., David Franklin, Marijuana and Judicial Modesty, CHI. TRIB., June
9, 2005, at 27 (commenting that, through a series of recent decisions, the Court has
reaffirmed its role as the sole interpreter of the Constitution); Jeffrey Rosen, The End of
Deference, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 2000, at 39, 42-43 (reviewing LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000)) (observing that between 1995 and 2000
the Court struck down twenty-five federal laws on grounds of federalism or separation of
powers, yet between 1941 and 1995 not a single federal law was found unconstitutional
for exceeding Congress's ability to control interstate commerce).
Aside from these constitutional rulings, the Rehnquist Court also invoked
federalism principles in several cases of statutory interpretation to limit the
encroachment of federal regulation on the states themselves or into areas historically
regulated by the states alone. For instance, in Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), the Court stated that when "Congress intends to alter the
'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must
make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."' Id. at 65
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). It therefore held
that neither a state nor its officials, when acting in their official capacities, were "persons"
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 71. Similarly, the Court held in Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), that a private
individual could not bring a qui tam action against a state under the False Claims Act because
the states are not "persons" subject to suit under the Act. Id. at 787. Alluding to "the doctrine
that statutes should be construed so as to avoid difficult constitutional questions," the Court
noted that "there is 'a serious doubt"' as to "whether an action in federal court by a qui tam
relator against a State would run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment." Id.; see also Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858-59 (2000) (invoking the same canon of constitutional doubt to
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attention these decisions have drawn, their practical effects have
actually been quite modest.22 For instance, the Court's Commerce
Clause decisions affect only a small spectrum of activity that
Congress might otherwise regulate-activity that is
noncommercial, noneconomic, and purely intrastate.23  Its
sovereign immunity decisions leave open a host of alternative
means for enforcing federal law against state governments, most
notably suits for injunctions under Ex Parte Young.24 Its
anticommandeering decisions prohibit a form of legislation that
Congress had employed only rarely and for which there are
typically a number of effective substitutes. Perhaps most
significantly, the Rehnquist Court did nothing to trim Congress's
authority under the Spending Clause, leaving Congress the
ability to circumvent most of these constraints by enacting
conditional spending legislation aimed at the states.26
Still, even if the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions did
not constitute a "federalism revolution," they seem to have done
something. It is now clear, as it was not before 1995, that there
are judicially enforceable limits on Congress's commerce power,
particularly with respect to activities that have historically been
regulated by the states.27 Congress's capacity to enact legislation
to enforce the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment has
been narrowed, such that any legislative effort to enforce a
constitutional right or to protect a class of citizens that the Court
has not deemed deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny is
hold that the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), does not apply to owner-occupied
residences that have not been used for any commercial purpose).
22. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (suggesting that, in terms of practical
consequences, these decisions may have been more symbolic).
23. See Mark Tushnet, "Meet The New Boss"- The New Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 1205, 1223-26 (2005) (describing congressional power under the Commerce Clause
and federalism's limited effect upon it); Althouse, supra note 1, at 142 (concluding that
the Court has only "modestly trimmed" congressional power).
24. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) (recognizing that a court may
enjoin an officer of a state from enforcing an unconstitutional act against an affected
party).
25. See Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 403, 483-84 (2003) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166
(1992)) (commenting that, even while denying Congress the power to commandeer, the
Court has identified many alternatives by which federal interests may be encouraged or
regulated).
26. See Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the
Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 52 (2003).
27. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 674, 685-86 (1995)
("Before Lopez, many academics and lower court judges speculated that the Commerce
Clause no longer imposed any limits on congressional action. The Supreme Court's
decision in Lopez resoundingly rejected that notion.").
514 [44:3
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virtually per se invalid.28 And, because Congress can abrogate the
sovereign immunity of states only through legislation enacted
under the Reconstruction Amendments,29 Congress has lost an
important means for enforcing federal law against the states.
These consequences are not trivial.
Moreover, if the Rehnquist Court did not move the law in
revolutionary directions itself, it may nonetheless have laid the
groundwork for a future Court to do so. As others have noted, the
newly constituted Roberts Court could use the Rehnquist Court's
precedents to disrupt some long-settled constitutional
understandings." It could hold that landmark environmental
legislation, such as the Endangered Species Act or the Clean
Water Act, is beyond Congress's commerce power, at least in
many of its applications, because the regulated activity is not
sufficiently connected to interstate commerce.3' It could conclude
that the anticommandeering decisions have effectively
undermined Garcia and hold that Congress cannot use its
commerce power to regulate certain functions of state
governments.32 It could hold that the disparate impact provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are unconstitutional as
applied to state governments, at least with respect to private
suits for damages, because they are not "congruent and
proportional" to any purported constitutional violations."
28. See Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism,
Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, n.92
(2003) (opining that legislation enacted to protect groups not entitled to heightened
scrutiny will not likely survive judicial review).
29. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
30. See TUSHNET, supra note 14, at 320-29 (suggesting several areas in which a
conservative court might transform the understanding of constitutional law).
31. See, e.g., GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 2004)
(listing the six circuit judges dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc and suggesting
that application of the Endangered Species Act to a species of cave bugs in Texas is
unconstitutional); Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1158-59 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(identifying the two judges, including John Roberts, dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc and concluding that application of the Endangered Species Act to arroyo toads in
California might be beyond Congress's commerce power); Lee Pollack, The "New"
Commerce Clause: Does Section 9 of the ESA Pass Constitutional Muster After Gonzales v.
Raich?, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 205, 236-45 (2007) (arguing that "the constitutional fate of
[ESA] Section 9 is less certain.., than other scholars have previously suggested").
32. Cf John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-
Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 825 (2001) (arguing that the Court's
federalism decisions have undermined if not overruled Garcia, but recognizing the
enhanced protection federalism provides for state interests in the context of treaties, as
opposed to statutes); see also Neil S. Seigel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A
Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1633-34 (2006) (evaluating the impact of
the anticommandeering doctrine of federalism values).
33. See Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Ne. ll. Univ., 207
F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (reserving the question of whether Title VII's disparate impact
2007] 515
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Conceivably, though much less likely, it could hold that most
federal antidiscrimination legislation is beyond Congress's
commerce power because the regulated activity of
discrimination-whether based on race, gender, religion, age, or
disability-is not "economic" or "commercial" in nature.34
Whatever the ultimate significance of the Rehnquist Court's
federalism project, the conventional wisdom seems to be that
O'Connor played a central role in its development. When
O'Connor announced her retirement in July 2005, assessments of
her legacy teemed with references to her views on the balance
between federal and state power. In its tribute, the New York
Times editorial page mentioned "her strong support for
federalism," and that "[slhe was fiercely protective of states'
rights."" Nina Totenberg observed that O'Connor "became part of
a conservative states-rights majority,"36 while Linda Greenhouse
wrote that she had been "a loyal ally" of Rehnquist "in the
[C]ourt's continuing reappraisal of the relationship between the
states and the federal government."37 Academics echoed these
views. A.E. Dick Howard said that "it was O'Connor as much as
Rehnquist ... who revived the doctrine of states' rights,"" while
John Yoo commented that O'Connor's "signature issue,... that
historians will look back on, is that she really was the person
who helped bring about and restore states' rights and more of a
balance of powers between the federal government and the state
governments."39 Stephen Wermeil's view nicely summarizes the
prevailing sentiment:
[O'Connor was] strongly motivated by her abiding faith
in good government at the state level and her belief that
the Framers of the Constitution envisioned a genuine
partnership of shared powers between the federal
government and the states. Her experience as a state
standard exceeds Congress's Section Five authority for another day); TUSHNET, supra note
14, at 326-27 (stating that a ban on disparate impact discrimination is a form of affirmative
action and could be challenged by a conservative Court); Richard A. Primus, Equal
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 494-95 (2003).
34. See TUSHNET, supra note 14, at 325-27.
35. Editorial, Justice O'Connor, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A14.
36. All Things Considered: O'Connor Steps Down from the Bench (National Public
Radio broadcast July 1, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=4726789.
37. Linda Greenhouse, Consistently, A Pivotal Role as Groundbreaking Justice Held
Balance of Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at Al.
38. Michael D. Lemonick & Viveca Novak, The Power Broker, TIME, July 11, 2005,
at 31, 32.
39. Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Justice O'Connor's Legacy (PBS television broadcast
July 1, 2005), available at httpiwww.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec05/oconnor-7-1.html.
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legislator and judge [gave] her a degree of trust in state
government and state courts that [went] well beyond
that of her colleagues."
There is more than just a grain of truth in these accounts.
Most prominently, O'Connor joined each of the Rehnquist Court's
landmark decisions that invalidated acts of Congress on
federalism grounds." And, unlike in other areas of the law,
O'Connor rarely swung over to the Court's more liberal wing to
form a majority coalition." In fact, in the last high-profile
federalism decision of her tenure on the Court, Gonzales v.
Raich,4" O'Connor authored a strident dissent from the Court's
holding that Congress could regulate the possession of home-
grown marijuana used exclusively for medicinal purposes. While
Justices Scalia and Kennedy sided with the pro-Congress
majority, O'Connor argued that such an application of the federal
Controlled Substances Act ventured into a sphere reserved
exclusively to the states: "If the Court always defers to Congress
as it does today, little may be left to the notion of enumerated
powers."44
Moreover, in addition to authoring some of the more
significant opinions in the federalism revival,4 O'Connor used
her opinions to advance fairly deep theoretical justifications for
federalism as an abiding constitutional principle-deeper than
she tended to develop in other contexts. In her dissent in FERC
40. Stephen J. Wermiel, O'Connor: A Dual Role-An Introduction, 13 WOMEN'S RTs.
L. REP. 129, 139 (1991); see also Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine,
and the Federalist Revival after Gonzales v. Raich, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1, 3
(Dennis J. Hutchinson, David A. Strauss, & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2006) (calling
O'Connor "the Court's most consistently pro-federalism member"); Edward L. Rubin &
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903,
928 (1994) (calling O'Connor one of "federalism's most enthusiastic proponents"); Rosen,
supra note 2, at 64 (referring to O'Connor's "attachment to states' rights" and "the
federalism revolution that O'Connor has led"); Marci Hamilton, The Remarkable Legacy of
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, FINDLAw LEGAL NEWS & COMMENT., July 14, 2005,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20050714.html (writing of "Justice O'Connor's
belief in the decentralization of power in the constitutional scheme" and "in the
importance of preserving a sphere of regulation for the states that may well differ from,
and even pose a challenge to, the federal government's larger public policy").
41. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
42. See Whittington, supra note 14, at 507. O'Connor's only notable defections from
the typical, five-justice pro-state majority in cases involving the federalism-based limits
on Congress were in the two Eleventh Amendment decisions of Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509 (2004), and Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). See infra Part III.B. But see
Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
43. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005).
44. Id. at 47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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v. Mississippi, for instance, O'Connor contended that "the 50
States serve as laboratories for the development of new social,
economic, and political ideas," citing the examples of women's
suffrage, unemployment insurance, minimum wage laws, no-
fault auto insurance, and environmental protection. 6 She also
argued that "federalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens
to participate in representative government," and explained that
"[ciitizens... cannot learn the lessons of self-government if their
local efforts are devoted to reviewing proposals formulated by a
faraway national legislature."47 Finally, she posited that "our
federal system provides a salutary check on governmental
power," noting that "[u]nless we zealously protect these" divisions
of authority, "we risk upsetting the balance of power that
buttresses our basic liberties."48 Or, as she wrote in Gregory v.
Ashcroft, "U]ust as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent
the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front."49
In short, there is much to be said for the conventional view
of O'Connor as a strong defender of state autonomy. But the
decisions on which these perceptions seem to be based all
addressed the Constitution's structural limits on the national
government. From New York to Lopez to Garrett to Raich, the
issue was whether Congress had exceeded its enumerated
powers, and thus impermissibly intruded on state sovereignty.'o
But, as explained further below, federalism is a two-way street.
It is as much about the structural limits on the states as those on
the national government."' Thus, a conception of federalism that
46. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 789-90.
48. Id. at 790.
49. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
50. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005) ("The question presented in this case
is whether the power vested in Congress by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution... includes
the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with
California law."); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) ("The
question, then, is whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority. .. ");
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The issue in
this case is whether the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to enact a statute that
makes it a crime to possess a gun in, or near, a school."); New York, 505 U.S. at 149 ("The
constitutional question ... consists of discerning the proper division of authority between
the Federal Government and the States.").
51. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 89-90
(15th ed. 2004).
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focuses solely on the breadth of Congress's authority is unduly
narrow, for it ignores the degree to which states can, or cannot,
exercise policymaking autonomy in areas of concurrent federal
and state regulatory jurisdiction-which is to say, most areas of
modern American life.5" To gain a more complete picture, we need
to widen the lens of federalism, the point to which I now turn.
III. A BROADER CONCEPTION OF FEDERALISM
In its plainest terms, federalism is a system of governance in
which two distinct governments simultaneously exercise
sovereignty over the same population and geographic territory. It
implies a constitutionalized division of power between these two
centers of authority-between the national and state
governments-with neither fully answerable to the other, each
independent sovereigns in certain respects, yet all part of one
nation.53 For this division of power to work in practice, there
must be rules that delineate the respective roles of the national
and state governments. These rules need not necessarily be
enforced by the courts, nor must they be formally codified. But
for a system of government to be accurately characterized as
federal, such rules must exist in one form or another.54
52. See generally Fallon, supra note 14, at 431-33 (theorizing that the Rehnquist
Court's "federalism revival" can be categorized into three prominent lines, each of them
focusing on congressional authority rather than protections afforded to the states); Calvin
Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 511-12 (2002)
(arguing the importance of ensuring that Congress has indeed focused upon the
displacement of state authority before legislating a preemptive federal law); Young, supra
note 14, at 130-34 ("The first priority of federalism doctrine ought to be limiting the
preemptive impact of federal law on state regulation. Stressing preemption shifts the
focus firmly back onto what state governments do.").
53. See, e.g., Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The
essence of a constitutionally formulated federalism is the division of political and legal
powers between two systems of government constituting a single Nation.").
54. It is worth noting that federalism has no particular ideological valence. See
Cross, supra note 1, at 1307-08 (writing that "states' rights arguments are not inherently
ideological"). Although it has generally been associated with conservative political causes
over the course of American history, that has not always been the case. Indeed, recent
issues-such as the medicinal use of marijuana, physician-assisted suicide, and gay
marriage, not to mention the presidential election dispute in Florida in 2000-have all
involved circumstances in which progressive political causes have embraced the principle
of state policymaking autonomy. See, e.g., Stephen Clark, Progressive Federalism? A Gay
Liberationist Perspective, 66 ALB. L. REV. 719, 723 (2003) (questioning the "soundness of
conventionally progressive opposition to federalism and local control"). Nor does the
concept of federalism, in itself, dictate a specific balance of power between the national
government and the states. Of course, for a system of federalism to be truly federalist,
both centers of government must have some independent existence. But beyond that
minimum, authentically federal systems can differ quite dramatically in the relative
strengths of the national government and the states. See Sunita Parikh & Barry R.
Weingast, A Comparative Theory of Federalism: India, 83 VA. L. REV. 1593, 1593, 1599-
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More to the point, these rules must limit both centers of power,
not just the national government. While an unconstrained national
government could potentially swallow up the independent existence
of the states-a point the Rehnquist Court repeatedly
emphasized-so, too, might the states act in ways that would
effectively destroy the Union.55 Indeed, problems of this sort under
the Articles of Confederation, especially in commercial matters,
were largely why the Constitution came into being.56 A principal
defect of the Articles was that they did little to prevent the states
from acting in self-interested ways that undermined the interests of
the nation as a whole. States imposed various barriers to interstate
commerce, such as protective tariffs on goods from other states; they
often failed to comply with the Continental Congress's requisitions,
the chief mechanism for funding the federal government; they
encroached on the federal government's authority, such as by
entering into compacts with each other and signing their own
treaties with Indian tribes; and they disregarded international
agreements that the federal government had reached with other
nations." In the words of James Madison, the states had a
"centrifugal tendency" to "fly out of their proper orbits and destroy
the order [and] harmony of the political system."58 A chief purpose of
the Constitution, then, was to create a "[flirm Union" that would
preserve "the peace and liberty of the States"59-to reduce "[tihe
interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States" that had
1606 ("Federalism is not a single type of system, but a family of disparate systems.").
55. This was, of course, the animating idea behind the Court's holding in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), that Maryland's tax on the Bank of the United States
was unconstitutional. Id. at 436. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, to permit states such a
power would be "in its nature incompatible with, and repugnant to, the constitutional
laws of the Union." Id. at 425.
56. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
at 466 (1969) ("But once men grasped... that reform of the national government was the
best means of remedying the evils caused by the state governments, then the revision of
the Articles of Confederation assumed an impetus and an importance that it had not had
a few years earlier."); see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 51, at 123 ("[Tlhe poor
condition of American commerce and the proliferating trade rivalries among the states
were the immediate provocations for the calling of the Constitutional Convention.").
57. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 9-10 (5th ed. 2005); see
also 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 164 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION] ("Experience had evinced a
constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority; to violate national
Treaties, to infringe the rights & interests of each other.... ."); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER,
supra note 51, at 123.
58. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 57, at 165.
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis omitted).
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become "injurious impediments to the intercourse between the
different parts of the Confederacy."0
Structural limits on the powers of state governments are,
thus, a central aspect of American federalism. And those limits,
manifested in several distinct constitutional provisions and
doctrines, remain critical elements of our governmental
structure.61 The Supremacy Clause, through the doctrine of
preemption, dictates that validly enacted federal laws shall
negate any state laws with which they conflict.62 The Dormant
Commerce Clause generally nullifies state laws that discriminate
against, or place undue burdens on, interstate commerce.63 The
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV forbids states
from discriminating against the citizens of other states unless
there is a substantial reason for doing so and the discrimination
is substantially related to that justification.64 The doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity prohibits states from directly
regulating the federal government or enacting laws that
discriminate against the federal government's interests.65 And
the Import-Export and Duty of Tonnage Clauses impose specific
constraints on the states' taxing powers.66 Cases involving these
union-preserving aspects of federalism tend to receive less
attention than those addressing the breadth of Congress's
legislative authority. They are often fact specific, turning on the
precise scope or purpose of the state or federal laws at issue, and
typically do not address broad constitutional principles.67 Still,
the overall trajectory of these decisions is quite important to the
federal-state balance-perhaps even more important to the
underlying values of federalism than the high-profile cases
involving the limits on Congress's enumerated powers, such as
Lopez, Printz, or Seminole Tribe.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
61. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1021.
62. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 326-27 (1819).
63. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1970).
64. See Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998).
65. See Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 810-13 (1989). This doctrine,
as it affects government employees, is now codified in the Public Salary Tax Act, 4 U.S.C.
§ 111 (2000). The Supreme Court has held that the scope of the statutory prohibition and
the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity are coterminous. See id. at
813 ("[W~e conclude that the retention of immunity in § 111 is coextensive with the
prohibition against discriminatory taxes embodied in the modern constitutional doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity.").
66. See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 264-66 (1935) (discussing
"the prohibition against tonnage duties"); Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 73 U.S. 632,
639 (1867) (explaining that states' ability to tax imports and exports is restricted to those
that are necessary under their inspection laws).
67. See Massey, supra note 52, at 436.
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Consider the most pervasive of these limitations on state
power, the doctrine of preemption. So long as Congress acts
within its enumerated powers, it can displace state law
addressing the same subject, and it can do so in express or
implied terms." The fields regulated by the federal government
have grown dramatically over the last century, such that federal
law now reaches into almost every corner of national life. From
crime to occupational safety to environmental protection, federal
law governs private conduct that was generally subject only to
state control for the nation's first 150 years.69 Granted, some of
the Rehnquist Court's decisions have narrowed the breadth of
Congress's legislative powers. But they have done so only at the
margins; Congress can still regulate any activity that is economic
or commercial in nature, as well as a good deal of activity that is
not.7°
Thus, in a post-New Deal, post-Great Society world, the vast
majority of human activity in the United States can be regulated
by both the federal government and the states. Consequently, the
frequency with which the Supreme Court concludes that federal
statutes have displaced state law within this expansive realm of
concurrent jurisdiction is critical to the breadth and significance
of the states' residuary powers. To cite only a few recent
examples, it determines the states' leeway to regulate the
practices of health maintenance organizations;7 whether states
can regulate automobile emissions in an effort to reduce
68. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the Distrust of Politics,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1781, 1790 (2001) (summarizing the significance of preemption).
69. See id. at 1791.
70. As the Court clarified in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), noneconomic,
noncommercial, purely intrastate activities are still subject to federal regulation if
Congress rationally "concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would
undercut" a larger, comprehensive scheme that, taken as a whole, plainly regulates
interstate commerce. Id. at 17-18. Moreover, Congress can cure any constitutionally
deficient statute by adding a "jurisdictional element"-language that ensures, on a case-
by-case basis, that the regulated activity has a sufficient connection to interstate
commerce. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). In fact, this is precisely what happened in the wake of
the Court's decision in Lopez. A year later, Congress amended the Gun-Free School Zones
Act to add eleven words to 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A), defining the relevant offense as the
knowing possession of "a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or
foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe,
is a school zone." Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, § 657 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(2)(A)(2000)) (emphasis added).
71. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004); Ky. Ass'n of Health
Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 333-34, (2003); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,
536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002); see also Theodore W. Ruger, The United States Supreme Court
and Health Law: The Year in Review, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 528, 528 (2004) (discussing
the implications of the Aetna decision for the federal regulation of healthcare).
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greenhouse gases; 71 whether states can use their investment and
procurement practices to express their moral objections to the
human rights records of foreign regimes;" and the terms on
which states can regulate the advertising and labeling of tobacco
products to promote the health of their citizens.74 These questions
might be narrow in a constitutional sense, but they are
collectively quite important to the states' practical strength as
centers of policymaking authority.
The contours of preemption doctrine, as well as the other
doctrines surrounding the Constitution's union-preserving
federalism provisions, are therefore critical to the values that
federalism is supposed to promote-the values that O'Connor
often highlighted in her opinions. States can hardly operate as
laboratories of democracy, or offer a diverse array of public goods,
if their idiosyncratic policy initiatives are routinely displaced by
federal law. As Ernest Young explained, "[t]he whole point of
preemption is generally to force national uniformity on a
particular issue, stifling state-by-state diversity and
experimentation."75  Preemption also pulls the relevant
decisionmaking process further away from the affected citizens,
eliminating the solutions reached by state and local communities
and placing control of the issue in Washington.6 Moreover, to the
extent vibrant state autonomy operates as an important check on
tyranny, preemption undermines this objective by centralizing
more control over public policy in one government.77
Hence, if we want a complete picture of a justice's approach
to federalism, we need to look beyond the decisions addressing
the limits of Congress's powers. We should also consider those
cases involving the various union-preserving provisions and
doctrines that constrain state authority in areas where federal
and state regulatory powers overlap. 8 As Justice Breyer has
72. See Miguel Bustillo, Stakes High as State Targets Greenhouse Gas From Cars,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at Al (describing a California law that imposes such
regulations, and the car industry's plan to enjoin enforcement on the ground that that the
law is preempted by federal fuel economy standards).
73. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000); Bd. of Trs.
of Employees' Ret. Sys. of City of Balt. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 746
(Md. 1989).
74. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550 (2001); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992).
75. Young, supra note 14, at 130.
76. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 685, 694 (1991).
77. Young, supra note 14, at 132.
78. Id. at 131 ("Doctrines limiting federal preemption of state law.., go straight to
the heart of the reasons why we care about federalism in the first place.").
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suggested, these cases arguably present the "true test" of a
justice's commitment to state policymaking autonomy within the
modern framework of federalism.79
IV. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S VOTING RECORD IN FEDERALISM CASES
A. Study Design
The purpose of this study is to test the descriptive accuracy of
the common assumption that Justice O'Connor tended to favor the
interests of the states in cases involving constitutional federalism.
My hypothesis is that, although this claim is generally correct as to
cases involving the federalism-based limits on the national
government, it does not accurately characterize O'Connor's behavior
in cases implicating the structural limits on the states.80 Because
my hypothesis is purely descriptive, testing it only required a
statistical summary rather than regression or some other tool
designed to derive descriptive or causal inferences. 81
To test this hypothesis, I created a unique data set.82 What
makes it distinctive is that it includes the full population of
federalism decisions handed down by the Supreme Court during
Justice O'Connor's tenure-every case implicating a structural
79. Justice Breyer's full statement reads as follows: "[11n today's world, filled with
legal complexity, the true test of federalist principle may lie, not in the occasional
constitutional effort to trim Congress' commerce power at the edges, or to protect a State's
treasury from a private damages action, but rather in those many statutory cases where
courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law." Egelhoff
v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
80. I am hardly the first person to notice the apparent tension in Justice O'Connor's
approach to the two sides of federalism-that she seemed to care more about state
autonomy in cases involving the limits on Congress than she did in cases involving the
limits on state governments. Erwin Chemerinsky, Frank Cross, Richard Fallon, Michael
Greve, Jonathon Klick, Seth Kreimer, Calvin Massey, Daniel Meltzer, Robert Schapiro,
and Ernest Young-to name only a few-have made the same point about the five justices
at the heart of the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1313, 1313-14 (2004); Cross, supra note 1, at 1310-11; Fallon, supra note 14, at 432;
Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 44 (2006); Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism
and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 68 (2001); Massey, supra note
52, at 436; Meltzer, supra note 14, at 344, n.1; Schapiro, supra note 14, at 247-48; Young,
supra note 14, at 23. To my knowledge, however, no scholar has yet supported this
assertion with a comprehensive summary of the justices' voting records.
81. On the potential value of statistical summaries to empirical legal studies-and
the methodological rules governing their validity-see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The
Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 24-29 (2002).
82. The data set and accompanying codebook are freely available for download at
http://claranet.scu.edu/coursepage.asp?cid=1902&page=01.
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provision addressing the constitutional division of authority
between the national government and the states.83 Because my
hypothesis is that O'Connor's support for state autonomy varied
depending on whether the constitutional provision at issue
limited the national government or the states, I coded the
decisions as falling into one of these two basic categories.84 I
83. The cases included in the study were identified in the following manner:
" First, I conducted searches in Westlaw's Supreme Court database
(SCT) searching for references to one of the relevant constitutional
provisions or doctrines in the headnotes of opinions. Thus, I ran
queries such as "he("eleventh amendment")," "he(preempt!)," and "he
("commerce clause")" for each of the relevant provisions or doctrines.
* Second, I read the text of each opinion generated by these queries to
determine whether the Court's holding-its ultimate legal judgment in
the case-addressed the provision or doctrine queried. In many cases it
did not, as the opinion simply referred to the relevant doctrine for
other reasons, such as to draw an analogy. Such cases were excluded
from the study universe.
* Third, my research assistant conducted searches in the Lexis-Nexis
Supreme Court database (U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers'
Edition) searching for references to one of the relevant constitutional
provisions or doctrines in the full text of opinions. For instance, he ran
the queries "(eleventh OR 11th) w/3 amendment" and "(tenth OR 10th)
w/3 amendment."
" Fourth, my research assistant then read these opinions and excluded
those whose holdings were clearly unrelated to the queried
constitutional provisions or doctrines, erring on the side of inclusion.
" Fifth, after my research assistant compiled lists of decisions involving
the various provisions and doctrines, I compared these lists to those
that I generated using Westlaw. I read all of the cases on my research
assistant's lists that did not appear on my lists.
" Finally, I added to the study universe those cases discovered by my
research assistant that I had not found in Westlaw in which the
Court's holding directly addressed the queried provision or doctrine.
84. Every case included in the study universe is listed in this Article's appendix,
infra, separated by the constitutional provision or doctrine at issue and presented in
reverse chronological order. Admittedly, this universe excludes a number of decisions in
which the justices' views on federalism and state autonomy were relevant to the
outcomes. For example, as discussed above, the Court on several occasions has invoked
federalism principles in cases of statutory interpretation outside the context of
preemption. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), for instance, the Court rejected the Corps's
interpretation of the Clean Water Act-which extended the Act's coverage to
nonnavigable, intrastate waters-on the ground that it raised "significant constitutional
and federalism questions" as to the breadth of Congress's commerce power. Id. at 173-74.
It is no coincidence that the five justices adopting this construction of the statute were
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, and that
the four dissenters were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The justices'
underlying views about the breadth of Congress's commerce power plainly shaped their
readings of the statute.
But expanding the scope of the study beyond these parameters would present a
number of methodological complications. To state the obvious, virtually every issue of
constitutional law has some ramifications for the breadth of the states' policymaking
autonomy. In the area of criminal procedure, for instance, the dramatic expansion of the
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coded the justices' votes as either favoring or disfavoring the
85
outcome that enhanced state autonomy.
Another important characteristic of the study is that it is
structured to capture Justice O'Connor's relative commitment to
state autonomy. 6 Specifically, it compares her votes to those of
the other eight justices who sat in precisely the same universe of
federalism cases. As a result, all of the potentially relevant
independent variables-the various legal texts and precedent,
the preferences of other institutional actors, the policy
consequences of the different outcomes, the quality of the parties'
advocacy, etc.-are held constant. In a sense, the methodology
employs a form of matching: given identical case stimuli, how
does Justice O'Connor's voting record in federalism cases
compare to that of her colleagues? My central premise is that, if
O'Connor deserves her reputation, she should have voted for
rights afforded to criminal defendants as a matter of federal constitutional law over the
last fifty years has-for better or worse-substantially curtailed the states' freedom to
experiment and resolve these questions as they see fit. See William J. Stuntz, Police
Powers, NEW REPUBLIC, July 25, 2005, at 20-21. Including every case decided by the
Court, however, would lump together decisions in which federalism was the predominant
issue with those in which it was only marginally relevant. For instance, federalism seems
quite important in some of the Court's habeas corpus decisions, but it is essentially
inapposite in others. Compare Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) (beginning
Justice O'Connor's famous opinion with the sentence: "This is a case about federalism."),
with Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (involving a careful parsing of the various
ways in which the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act amended the
standards for habeas relief articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
A potential solution would be to include those cases in which the federalism
issues seemed sufficiently salient, but it would be difficult, or perhaps impossible, to
devise selection criteria that would be both objective and meaningful. And absent such
objective criteria for defining the universe, the study would violate the critical standard of
replication. On the importance of empirical work adhering to the replication standard-
ensuring that "another researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and
reproduce the research without any additional information from the author"-see Epstein
& King, supra note 81, at 38.
85. The complete data set, in Microsoft Excel format, and accompanying codebook
are available for download at: http://claranet.scu.edu/coursepage.asp?cid=1902.
86. Merely tabulating the percentage of her votes that enhanced state autonomy
would tell us precious little. For instance, as the summary in Part III.B shows, O'Connor
voted for the outcome enhancing state autonomy in 48% of the cases involving the
federalism-based limits on the states. By itself, though, this does not demonstrate
whether O'Connor tended to support state autonomy, tended to oppose it, or was
ambivalent about it. Needless to say, a host of other variables or influences could have
affected her votes in the remaining 52% of the cases, all of which might be fully consistent
with a number of different attitudes about state autonomy. More to the point, the raw
figure of 48% would mean something quite different depending on the context of her
colleagues' behavior. If the other justices who sat in the same cases cast only 20% of their
votes in favor of state autonomy, O'Connor would look like a strong ally of the states; but
if 70% of her colleagues' votes in those cases favored the states, O'Connor would instead
appear quite hostile to state autonomy.
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outcomes favoring state autonomy at a higher rate than the
average of the other justices voting in the same cases.
The study covers two distinct, overlapping time frames. The
first is Justice O'Connor's entire twenty-four-plus terms on the
Court, from September 1981 to January 2006. Over this period,
comparisons of O'Connor's record to those of other individual
justices are fairly complicated, so I instead compared her votes to
the cumulative average of the other justices with whom she served.
The second time period is October 1994 to July 2005. I include this
as a distinct frame of reference because the same nine justices
served together for these eleven terms. The fortuity of this long-
serving "natural court" allows us to compare O'Connor's federalism
record to that of other specific justices in a large universe of
decisions.8
It is worth noting that, because the study aims to describe
the justices' behavior by tallying their votes favoring one outcome
or another, it suffers from the same shortcomings as other
87. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2007).
88. For every case in the universe, I coded the vote of each justice as either
(1) enhancing state autonomy or (2) reducing it. In most instances, this was simple.
Nevertheless, three issues are worth mentioning. First, nine cases presented two separate
federalism issues that addressed distinct constitutional provisions or doctrines. For
example, in Morrison, the Court addressed two questions: (a) whether the civil remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act was within Congress's commerce power, and
(b) whether it was valid legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000). In cases like this, I treated the
justices' positions on the two issues as two separate votes (and coded each as 1 or 2).
Thus, the study includes 246 votes cast by O'Connor, although she participated in only
237 cases. Because the various issues presented in these cases were largely independent,
treating them as separate votes seemed the best reflection of the justices' behavior.
Second, some cases presented multiple claims raised under the same
constitutional provision or doctrine. In several preemption cases, for example, the Court
addressed whether a variety of state law actions were preempted by federal law. In these
cases, I treated a justice's split vote-typically, a vote that one claim was preempted while
another one was not-as half of a vote for each outcome and coded it as 3. This follows the
protocol of another recent empirical study of the Rehnquist Court's voting patterns in
preemption cases. See Greve & Klick, supra note 80, at 94. This is essentially an arbitrary
judgment, but treating each claim within a preemption case as a separate case risked
distorting the results through an overpopulation of preemption votes.
Finally, some cases defied simple classification as to the constitutional provision
at issue. For instance, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court held that Congress had
not validly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity from private suits for damages
because Title I of the ADA was not valid Section Five legislation. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). One might deem this either an Eleventh
Amendment decision or a Section Five decision, but including it in both would double-
count a single vote. Thus, I simply assigned these cases to one category or the other. In
this instance, I classified Garrett and similar decisions as Section Five cases. Such
judgments about categorization are only matters of form, as the study ultimately
combines Eleventh Amendment and Section Five cases under the broader heading of
federalism decisions involving the limits on the national government.
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studies employing similar vote-counting, outcome-focused
methodologies.89 First, it ignores what the justices have actually
written in their opinions. And at the Supreme Court of the
United States, the content of the opinions can be more important
than whether the judgment under review was affirmed, reversed,
or vacated." Second, it places equal weight on each decision, even
though some cases are clearly more significant than others.9'
89. On the weaknesses inherent in such studies, see Barry Friedman, Taking Law
Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POLS. 261, 265-67 (2006); Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith, &
Antonio Tomarchio, The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law 7 (Soc. Sci. Research
Network, Working Paper Series, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909217.
90. See Friedman, supra note 89, at 266 (discussing the importance of the content of
Supreme Court's opinions in evaluating the significance of the Court's work). For
example, in the 2004 case of Tennessee v. Lane, the Court held that Congress had validly
abrogated the states' sovereign immunity in enacting Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, at least with respect to its application to state judicial facilities.
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004). The vote was 5-4, and Justice O'Connor
joined the majority. Id. at 512. I therefore coded her vote as reducing state autonomy. But
focusing exclusively on the outcome her vote supported misses much of what happened in
Lane. The majority substantially limited the scope of its holding, presumably to hold
O'Connor's vote, by only addressing Title II's application to state courthouses. Id. at 533-
34. The Court did not address the much broader question, pressed by the parties, as to
whether Title II validly abrogates state immunity when applied to the thousands of other
public accommodations covered by the ADA. Thus, while O'Connor sided with Congress,
she did so on limited terms, a nuance that binary vote counting necessarily misses.
By presenting O'Connor's voting record in federalism cases relative to the
justices with whom she served, I have substantially mitigated this problem. Regardless of
how the majority framed the question in a given case, the justices voted in ways that
expressed their relative preferences. For instance, one might question whether O'Connor's
vote in Lane was unfavorable to state autonomy in an absolute sense, but her vote clearly
was less protective of state autonomy than those registered by Rehnquist, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, each of whom dissented. Still, had Justice Stevens, the majority
opinion writer, framed the issue more broadly, O'Connor might well have switched sides.
See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Sandra Day O'Connor's Position on Discrimination, 4 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASs 241, 246 (2004) (positing that expanding the Lane
holding to include "an aspect of the Equal Protection Clause would have implied a much
broader right against the states"). That is, Stevens's discretionary choices about the
content of his opinion may well have altered O'Connor's vote. Thus, focusing on the
justices' relative voting records does not solve the problem entirely. Some votes to affirm
or reverse, as opposed to decisions to merely concur separately, probably depend on the
content of the Court's opinions.
91. The Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), holding for
the first time in sixty years that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce
Clause, seems a more important data point in measuring the justices' respective views on
federalism than the Court's unanimous decision in California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.,
523 U.S. 491 (1998). In Deep Sea Research, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar federal jurisdiction over in rem admiralty actions when the state does not
possess the property at issue. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 495. Again, one could try to
weigh the cases according to some assessment of their relative significance, but doing so
would raise the same issue of replication discussed earlier. By not doing so, though, we
obviously sacrifice a finer grained appreciation of the importance of the justices' various
votes.
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But these weaknesses should not be overstated. Outcomes
may be a rather "crude measure" of the Court's decisional
output,92 but they can still tell us a great deal about patterns of
judicial behavior. After all, the outcome a justice supports in a
given case is often the single most revealing piece of information
about her views on the issue. Moreover, focusing on outcomes
allows us to record the justices' positions quite objectively,
reducing the potential for bias in our data collection. Of course,
outcome-based studies cannot answer all of the interesting
questions we have about judicial decisionmaking, 93 but they can
constitute a significant part of the mix of methodological tools
that shed light on the Court's behavior.94
B. Results
1. October 1981 to January 2006. From September 1981,
when O'Connor was sworn in as an Associate Justice, until
January 2006, when she was replaced by Justice Samuel Alito,9'
O'Connor participated in 236 federalism decisions, casting 250
distinct votes. Roughly twenty percent of these votes were in
cases addressing the structural limits on the national
government's power. As Table 1 illustrates, O'Connor's voting
record in these cases was entirely consistent with her popular
reputation as a strong supporter of the states' independent
sovereignty and autonomy: she voted to invalidate the action of
the national government at roughly twice the rate of her
colleagues over the course of her tenure on the Court. These
differences are statistically significant at the P=.01 level.96
92. Cross, Smith & Tomarchio, supra note 89, at 7.
93. See Friedman, supra note 89, at 266.
94. See Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test
the "Legal Model" of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 493-94 (2001).
95. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2007).
96. One might dispute exactly how much statistical significance matters with
respect to the various figures presented in this study. Because the study includes the
entire universe of federalism decisions during Justice O'Connor's tenure on the Court, the
differences between her voting record and the various reference groups are descriptively
true, regardless of their statistical significance. But a test of statistical significance-here,
a difference of proportions test-helps assure us that the difference is not simply the
idiosyncratic result of the particular mix of cases that came before the Court while
O'Connor was a justice.
The following formulas are used to demonstrate the statistical significance of
the differences between two proportions. The standard deviation of the difference (SD) is
the square root of ((P, x (1 - P)) + N) + (P. x (1 - P)) + N) where P, is the first
proportion, P, is the second proportion, N, is the number of trials (or votes) out of which P,
2007] 529
HeinOnline  -- 44 Hous. L. Rev. 529 2007-2008
530 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [44:3
Table 1
Proportion of votes in favor of state autonomy in federalism cases
addressing the limits on the national government-October 1981 to
January 2006
Non-UnanimousAll DecisionsDeion Decisions
Justice O'Connor 65% 88%(N=57) (N=40)
All other justices combined (N=449) (N=317)
The picture is quite different, however, in federalism cases
involving the structural limits on state authority. During her tenure
on the Court, O'Connor participated in 182 cases in which a state
law was challenged on federalism grounds, yielding 193 distinct
votes. As Table 2 shows, O'Connor's voting record with respect to
state autonomy was essentially identical to the average voting
records of her colleagues. If anything, she was slightly less
protective of state autonomy than her colleagues, though these
differences are not statistically significant. 97
Table 2
Proportion of votes in favor of state autonomy in federalism cases addressing
the limits on state governments-October 1981 to January 2006
Non-UnanimousAll DecisionsDeion Decisions
47.15% 43.98%
Justice O'Connor 47.15% (N.18)(N=193) (N=108)
47.39% 45.12%
All other justices combined 49% 45.1(N=1,495) (N=841)
is a proportion, and N, is the number of trials (or votes) out of which P, is a proportion.
The Z-score for the difference equals (P, - P) - SD. At the P=.05 level of confidence
(where there is a 95% chance that the difference in the proportions is not the result of
random chance), Z=1.96. Thus, a Z-score of 1.96 or higher means statistical significance at
the level of P=.05. At the P=.01 level of confidence (where there is a 99% chance that the
difference in the proportions is not the result of random chance), Z=2.58. Thus, a Z-score
of 2.58 or higher means statistical significance at the P=.01 level. See David S. Moore,
THE BASic PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 504-07, 521-24 (4th ed. 2007).
In Table 1, the Z-score for the difference in all decisions (65% versus 35%) was 4.474.
The Z-score for the difference in non-unanimous decisions (88% versus 45%) was 7.355.
Because both of these Z-scores exceed 1.96, the differences are statistically significant.
97. In all decisions, the Z-score for the difference (47.15% versus 47.39%) was
0.0629. In non-unanimous decisions, the Z-score for the difference (43.98% versus 45.12%)
was 0.2246. Because both Z-scores fall below 1.96, the differences are not statistically
significant.
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2. October 1994 to July 2005. The same dichotomous pattern
holds for O'Connor's last eleven terms on the Court, though her
record in the union-preserving federalism cases is even more
intriguing. From October 1994 to July 2005, the Court decided
twenty-five cases involving the limits on Congress's enumerated
powers, yielding twenty-seven distinct voting opportunities for the
justices. As Figure 1 shows, the voting patterns in these cases
conform to the common perception of the Rehnquist Court:
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas typically voted
to invalidate the assertion of federal authority at issue, while
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer typically dissented.98
Figure 1
Proportion of votes in favor of state autonomy in federalism cases
addressing the limits on the national government-all decisions,
October 1994 to June 2005
(N=27)
80%
74%
70% 67%
63%/ 6 7%
60%d
50%
40%
30%
20%
Stevens Ginsburg Souter Breyer O'Connor Kennedy Rehnquist Scalia Thomnas
The Court's polarization is clearer when we limit our review
to its non-unanimous decisions. In these seventeen cases,
98. The differences between O'Connor's voting record in these cases and those of
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer are statistically significant at the P=.O1 level. The
differences between O'Connor's voting record and those of Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas are not statistically significant. The results of the Z-score calculations are as follows:
for O'Connor versus Stevens (63% versus 7%), Z=5.329; for O'Connor versus Ginsburg (63%
versus 11%), Z=4.697; for O'Connor versus Souter (63% versus 4%), Z=5.8847; for O'Connor
versus Breyer (63% versus 4%), Z=5.8847; for O'Connor versus Rehnquist (63% versus 67%),
Z=0.3084; for O'Connor versus Scalia (63% versus 70%), Z=0.5464; and for O'Connor versus
Thomas (63% versus 74%), Z=0.8868. There was no statistically significant difference between
O'Connor and Kennedy (63% versus 63%) because there was no difference.
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yielding eighteen votes per justice, the Court almost always split
5-4 along the same lines. Justice O'Connor's record in these
cases substantiates her reputation as a strong proponent of state
autonomy. Over these eleven terms, there were only three non-
unanimous decisions in which O'Connor voted to uphold the
exercise of federal authority: Nevada v. Hibbs, Tennessee v. Lane,
and Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood.99
Figure 2
Proportion of votes in favor of state autonomy in federalism cases
addressing the limits on the national government-non-unanimous
decisions, October 1994 to June 2005
(N=18)
120%
100%
100% 94%
83% 83% 1
80%40%
20%
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0% 0% M 0% 0%
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Again, O'Connor's record was quite different in cases addressing
the federalism-based limits on the states. Over the same time period,
the Court decided fifty-five cases involving the constitutional
provisions constraining state power, yielding fifty-eight distinct votes.
In these cases, Justice O'Connor was hardly sympathetic to the
99. Again, O'Connor's differences from Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer are
statistically significant at the P=.01 level, while her differences from Rehnquist, Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas are not statistically significant.The results of the Z-score calculations
are as follows: for O'Connor versus Stevens (83% versus 0%), Z=9.3746; for O'Connor
versus Ginsburg (83% versus 6%), Z=7.3506; for O'Connor versus Souter (83% versus 0%),
Z=9.3746; for O'Connor versus Breyer (83% versus 0%), Z=9.3746; for O'Connor versus
Rehnquist (83% versus 89%), Z=0.5207; for O'Connor versus Scalia (83% versus 94%),
Z=1.0501; and for O'Connor versus Thomas (83% versus 100%), Z=1.9201. Again, there
was no statistically significant difference between O'Connor and Kennedy (83% versus
83%) because there was no difference.
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states' policy initiatives. Indeed, she was the justice who voted least
frequently to sustain the assertion of state authority.100
Figure 3
Proportion of votes in favor of state autonomy in federalism cases
addressing the limits on state governments-all decisions, October 1994
to June 2005
(N=58)
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O'Connor's relative indifference to state autonomy in this
context is clearer when we isolate the Court's non-unanimous
decisions. In the twenty-seven cases between October 1994 and
June 2005 in which the Court disagreed over the application of a
federalism-based limit on the states, O'Connor cast only 7.5 votes
(twenty-eight percent) to uphold the challenged state law. This was
the lowest rate on the Court.1 1
100. The resulting Z-score calculations are as follows: for O'Connor versus Stevens
(38% versus 50%), Z=1.3115; for O'Connor versus Ginsburg (38% versus 56%), Z=1.9745;
for O'Connor versus Souter (38% versus 48%), Z=1.0934; for O'Connor versus Breyer (38%
versus 45%), Z=0.7670; for O'Connor versus Kennedy (38% versus 40%), Z=0.2209; for
O'Connor versus Rehnquist (38% versus 49%), Z=1.2023; for O'Connor versus Scalia (38%
versus 44%), Z=0.6582; and for O'Connor versus Thomas (38% versus 57%), Z=2.0870.
Only O'Connor's differences from Ginsburg and Thomas are statistically significant at the
P=.05 level.
101. The differences between O'Connor's voting record in these cases and those of
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Thomas are statistically significant at the P=.05 level.
The differences between her voting record and those of Rehnquist, Breyer, Scaliu, and
Kennedy are not statistically significant. The Z-score calculations are as follows: for
O'Connor versus Stevens (28% versus 57%), Z=2.2545; for O'Connor versus Ginsburg
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Figure 4
Proportion of votes in favor of state autonomy in federalism cases
addressing the limits on state governments-non-unanimous decisions,
October 1994 to June 2005
(N=27)
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V. DISCUSSION
In her first public address after announcing her retirement,
Justice O'Connor said that she viewed the states as
"laboratories": we should "[l]et them try things and see how it
works."' 2 The sentiment is one commonly associated with
O'Connor, but it is not one that she consistently expressed in her
voting record as a justice, at least in cases directly presenting
federalism questions. To be sure, O'Connor consistently voted for
results that protected state prerogatives in cases implicating the
structural limits on the national government.103 But in cases
(28% versus 67%), Z=3.1170; for O'Connor versus Souter (28% versus 54%), Z=2.0139; for
O'Connor versus Breyer (28% versus 46%), Z=1.3943; for O'Connor versus Kennedy (28%
versus 35%), Z=0.5552; for O'Connor versus Rehnquist (28% versus 52%), Z=1.8565; for
O'Connor versus Scalia (28% versus 42%), Z=1.0903; and for O'Connor versus Thomas
(28% versus 65%), Z=2.9349.
102. Ralph Thomas, Retiring Justice Worries About Loss of States' Rights, SEA]TLE
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A4.
103. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Bd.
of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority
with the Gun-Free School Zones Act). See also supra note 21 and accompanying text
(discussing the issue of federal encroachment on state sovereignty).
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involving the Constitution's union-preserving federalism
provisions-its structural limits on the states-she was no more
inclined to "let them try things" than the average justice with
whom she served.
If O'Connor was not quite the ardent proponent of state
autonomy that many have presumed, are there alternative
descriptions that capture her behavior in federalism cases?
Developing a full-blown theory of O'Connor's approach to
federalism goes beyond the scope of this Article. But let me at
least suggest a line of inquiry-one that would be fully consistent
with the priorities of the Republican Party of the late twentieth
century that propelled O'Connor onto the Court. °4
Instead of simply seeing federalism cases as presenting a
choice between more or less state autonomy, we might
alternatively conceptualize them as presenting choices about the
extent of government regulation generally. Whether they involve
the breadth of Congress's enumerated powers or the union-
preserving limits on the states, at stake are limits on the
government's power to regulate. Of course, when the Court holds
that that a state law has been preempted-and even when it
concludes that a state law violates the Dormant Commerce
Clause-federal regulation of the same activity usually remains
in place.' But a judgment invalidating the state law necessarily
reduces the aggregate level and stringency of the regulation of
that activity. In other words, every federalism case presents
some version of a choice between more or less regulation.
From this perspective, we can derive an alternative
characterization of O'Connor's voting record in federalism cases:
a general disposition towards reducing government regulation,
regardless of its source.' ° Consider again Justice O'Connor's 148
votes in non-unanimous federalism cases over her twenty-four-
104. Cross, Smith, & Tomarchio, supra note 89, at 3 (observing that, during his 1980
presidential election campaign, Ronald Reagan strongly criticized the liberal decisions of
the Warren Court, arguing "that the judiciary had lost its grounding in originalism and
restraint," and that, following his election, he was committed to appointing conservative
judges).
105. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982) (invalidating an
Illinois state law because of the burden on interstate commerce, but promoting the
Williams Act, a federal law regulating similar activity to a lesser degree).
106. Others, such as Frank Cross and Richard Fallon-taking a bluntly political view
of the Rehnquist Court's behavior-have attributed the deregulatory valence to aspects of
the Court's federalism project. See Cross, supra note 1, at 1322-24 (describing the
deregulatory nature of the Rehnquist Court's 1999 federalism decisions that limited the
legislative authority of Congress); Fallon, supra note 14, at 470-71 (positing that "the
substantive conservatism of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy" may well lead "them to view
the Commerce Clause as embodying antiregulatory, procompetitive ideals").
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plus terms on the Court: sixty-three percent of those votes
favored a reduction in government regulation, while the average
among the other justices sitting in the same cases was fifty-two
percent. Thus, her distance from the average voting record of the
other justices was the same along the dimensions of greater state
autonomy and less government regulation-she voted for
outcomes that enhanced state autonomy, as well as those that
reduced the stringency of government regulation, at a rate eleven
percent higher than her colleagues.0 7
Table 3
Proportion of votes in favor of state autonomy in federalism cases
addressing the limits on the national government-October 1981 to
January 2006
Votes toiValidate Votes in favor ofin v a lid a te s a e a t n m
regulation state autonomy
Justice O'Connor 63% 56%
(N=148)
All other justices combined 52% 45%
(N=1,158)
The deregulatory nature of O'Connor's voting record in
federalism cases was especially pronounced in her last eleven full
terms on the Court. She cast more than three-fourths of her votes
in non-unanimous decisions during these terms to invalidate the
regulation at issue, whether the regulation emanated from the
federal government or the states. 08 For this period, O'Connor's
voting record was the single most hostile on the Court to
government regulation in federalism cases.
107. Both of these differences of 11% are statistically significant at the P=.05 level.
For the difference between O'Connor and all other justices in the rate of voting to
invalidate the regulation at issue (63% versus 52%), Z=2.599. For the difference between
O'Connor and all other justices in the rate of voting for the result favoring state autonomy
(56% versus 45%), Z=2.538.
108. See, e.g., Lorrillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001).
109. O'Connor's difference from Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer are
statistically significant at the P=.05 level, while the remaining differences are not. The Z-
scores are as follows: for O'Connor versus Stevens (77% versus 24%), Z=5.9297; for
O'Connor versus Ginsburg (77% versus 22%), Z=6.2479; for O'Connor versus Souter (77%
versus 28%), Z=5.3412; for O'Connor versus Breyer (77% versus 32%), Z=4.8048; for
O'Connor versus Kennedy (77% versus 72%), Z=0.5450; for O'Connor versus Rehnquist
(77% versus 67%), Z=1.0630; for O'Connor versus Scalia (77% versus 73%), Z=0.4386; and
for O'Connor versus Thomas (77% versus 61%), Z=1.6661.
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Figure 5
Proportion of votes in favor of reducing regulation or regulatory
authority in federalism cases combined-non-unanimous decisions,
October 1994 to June 2005
(N=45)
Stevens Ginsburg Souter Breyer O'Connor Kennedy Rehnquist Scalia Thomas
Another way to explore the question is to confine our review
to those federalism decisions addressing the legality of laws,
regulations, or common law liability rules imposed on private
businesses. Because Congress's authority to regulate economic or
commercial activity is essentially unquestioned, these decisions
all involved the legality of state or local regulations." ° As a
result, each decision in this category presented a choice between
an outcome favoring state policymaking autonomy and an
outcome favoring less stringent regulation of private business.
And these cases reveal the same basic pattern. Over the course of
her entire career, Justice O'Connor voted for the outcome
favoring state autonomy (45.9%, N=159) at a rate slightly lower
than that of her colleagues (49.2%, N=1,231), though this
difference is not statistically significant. And over her last eleven
110. See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 526-27 (2001) (holding Article VIII of
Missouri's Constitution regarding election term limits unconstitutional); Lunding v. N.Y.
Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 290-91 (1998) (holding a New York law in violation
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
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full terms on the Court, she voted for the outcome favoring state
autonomy less frequently than any other justice.'11
Figure 6
Proportion of votes in favor of reducing regulation in non-unanimous
federalism decisions involving the legality of regulations imposed on
private businesses-October 1994 to June 2005
(N=21)
90%
80% 794
74%
70%
62% 60
55%
50% 45%
40% 38% 36
36%
30%%
30%-
20%
10%
Stevens Ginsburg Souter Breyer O'Connor Kennedy Rehnquist Scalia Thomas
Again, these data do not support the causal inference that
O'Connor voted as she did because of a preference to reduce
government regulation. A number of other variables might have
influenced her behavior in federalism cases: her responsiveness
to the position taken by the Solicitor General; her sense of public
opinion or the preferences of Congress, the President, or lower
court judges; her situational relationship with her colleagues and
her role in their group dynamic; or her policy preferences along
dimensions other than state autonomy or business regulation.
112
111. The differences between O'Connor's voting record on this score and those of
Stevens, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Souter, are statistically significant at the P=.05 level.
The remaining differences are not. The Z-score computations are as follows: for O'Connor
versus Stevens (79% versus 31%), Z=3.5692; for O'Connor versus Ginsburg (79% versus
38%), Z=2.9652; for O'Connor versus Souter (79% versus 45%), Z=2.4233; for O'Connor
versus Breyer (79% versus 55%), Z=1.7105; for O'Connor versus Kennedy (79% versus
74%), Z=0.3828; for O'Connor versus Rehnquist (79% versus 62%), Z=1.2295; for
O'Connor versus Scalia (79% versus 60%), Z=1.3666; and for O'Connor versus Thomas
(79% versus 36%), Z=3.1302.
112. These characteristics have been discussed by several authors. See, e.g., M. David
Gelfand & Keith Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a "Conservative"
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Testing the significance of such influences would require a
multiple regression that incorporated, to the extent feasible, each
of these variables and perhaps others.
Still, the data presented here are revealing in two important
ways. First, O'Connor's tendency to support state autonomy-
though greater than the average justice-was only evident in
cases involving the limits on the federal government; she was no
more protective of state autonomy than the average of her
colleagues in cases involving the structural limits on the states.
Second, in the full run of federalism cases, O'Connor voted as
frequently to reduce regulation or regulatory authority as she did
to enhance state policymaking autonomy, and she did so much
more frequently over her last eleven full terms on the Court. This
was especially true in cases presenting a dichotomous choice
between an outcome that enhanced state autonomy and one that
reduced government regulation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In his pathbreaking 1957 article Decision-Making in a
Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,
Robert Dahl wrote that "the policy views dominant on the
[Supreme] Court are never for long out of line with the policy
views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United
States.""3 More recently, a number of political scientists have
extended and refined Dahl's thesis, forming a school of thought
commonly known as the "regime politics" approach to judicial
behavior. The basic theory-advanced by such scholars as Mark
Graber, Howard Gillman, Cornell Clayton, Mitch Pickerill, Keith
Whittington, and Terri Peretti-is that the Court's power and
substantive views are deliberately constructed by the dominant
national political coalition."' Though the Court certainly
Court: Currents and Cross-Currents from Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1443, 1475 (1990) (suggesting that O'Connor's "functionalist approach" and her history as
a legislator led to "more deferential and less activist judicial decision[s]"); Tracey E.
George, Judicial Independence and the Ambiguity of Article III Protections, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 221, 228-29 (2003) (suggesting that O'Connor with President Reagan might have
been defined on the basis of her ideology, including her position on issues such as
abortion); Merrill supra note 2, at 576, 629-30, 636-37 (reporting that "Court watchers
have long suggested that [Justices O'Conner and Kennedy] are the most sensitive to
external forces," such as public opinion); Mary Massaron Ross & Mary R. Vasaly, Recent
Developments in Appellate Law, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 181, 187-90 (2006)
("Justice O'Connor's state legislative background... made her a strong proponent of
federalism.").
113. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).
114. See Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime
20071 539
HeinOnline  -- 44 Hous. L. Rev. 539 2007-2008
540 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [44:3
exercises independent judgment on a case-by-case basis, its
general ideological direction is shaped by political developments
external to the Court. Constitutional development is more the
product of shifts in the governing national coalition than the
occasion of the justices finally being won over by particular legal
arguments. Thus, the Court is best conceived as an integral
policymaking partner of the ascendant political majority, or at
least as an influential segment of that majority.115
Regime politics theory is probably better suited to explain
the behavior of the Court as a whole than the actions of a single
justice. But Justice O'Connor's voting record in federalism cases
certainly appears to resemble the political priorities of the
conservative movement that gave rise to her career. While the
Republican Party of the last thirty years has often emphasized
the importance of the independent sovereignty of the states, it
has generally done so by advocating for enforcement of the
structural limits on Congress's authority and for a reduction of
the size of the federal government. 6 To be sure, GOP thought on
the subject has not been monolithic, and those genuinely
committed to state autonomy have achieved some policy
successes, such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995."
But the modern Republican Party as a whole has never embraced
a broader constitutional program to substantially enhance the
legislative autonomy of the states."8 This seems especially true in
Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 511, 511, 515-19 (2007)
(book review) (identifying contemporary political scientists studying regime politics in
order to understand the influence of majority power on judicial behavior).
115. There are two principal mechanisms by which this might occur. First, the
President and the Senate select justices based largely on their ideology, ensuring that the
justices' substantive views will tend to reflect those of the dominant coalition at the time
of their nominations. Second, regardless of the views that they take to the bench, the
Court as an institution is substantially constrained by the preferences of the
contemporary Congress and President. Without the sword or the purse, the justices must
be cognizant-consciously or unconsciously--of the views of the extant political regime in
making their decisions. Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 Nw. U. L.
REV. 131, 138 ("Lacking the powers of purse and sword, the Supreme Court must make
sure that its decisions are acceptable to the American people and their elected officials.
Otherwise, the Court risks a political backlash-one that will almost certainly undo any
doctrinal innovations that it might pursue.").
116. See Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 14, at 236-39 (discussing the Republican
Party's federalism initiatives since the 1960s).
117. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995)
(codifed at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1538, 1571 (2000)).
118. For instance, consider such Republican-sponsored initiatives as the Defense of
Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28
U.S.C. § 1738(c) (2000)) (ensuring that no requirement exists for a state to give effect to
the same sex relationships legitimized under the laws of another state); No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. §§ 6301 et seq. (2006)) (establishing federal law with respect to the administration
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the area of commercial regulation. Consider such GOP initiatives
as the decades-long effort to enact federal tort reform legislation,
recently resulting in the Class Action Fairness Act;'19 the
inclusion of express preemption clauses in numerous Republican-
sponsored statutes; 0 and the use of agency rulemaking by the
present Bush Administration to preempt wide swaths of state
law,121 just to name a few.
Justice O'Connor plainly cared about federalism, and she
believed strongly in the judicial enforcement of the structural
limits on the national government. But, more generally, her
voting record in cases involving the federalism-based constraints
on state governments did not reveal a particular concern for state
policymaking autonomy. Like the political coalition that placed
her on the Court-or at least an influential aspect of that
coalition-she tended to favor outcomes that enhanced state
autonomy but to no greater degree than she favored outcomes
that reduced the stringency of government regulation. In this
way, she appears to have reflected the priorities of the modem
Republican Party. Given O'Connor's place as the median justice
on a Republican-dominated Court, this is entirely unsurprising.
of elementary and secondary school education); the effort to intervene in the Terri Schiavo
saga, An Act For the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3,
119 Stat. 15, 15 (2005) (removing jurisdiction from Florida state courts and providing
federal court standing to parents of Schiavo against anyone withholding food or medical
treatment necessary to sustain her life); and the Department of Justice's attempts to
undercut California's legalization of medical marijuana in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
6-9 (2005), and Oregon's legalization of physician-assisted suicide in Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243, 251-55 (2006).
119. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (codified as
note to 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006)).
120. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 685-86
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717 et seq. (2006)) (preempting various state
environmental protections); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952, 1961, 1972-73 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et
seq. (2006)) (preempting some state credit reporting and identity theft laws); CANSPAM
Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699, 2716 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7702 et seq.
(2006)) (preempting state laws regulating unsolicited e-mail spam); Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2827 (2005) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d) (preempting state tort law with respect to injuries from
certain drugs and vaccines); Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No.
109-92, 119 Stat. 2095, 2096 (2005) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901 et seq.))
(preempting state authority to file civil actions against gun manufacturers).
121. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 227-29 (2007) (discussing efforts to
preempt state laws through rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration, the
Consumer Products Safety Commission, and the National Highway and Transportation
Safety Administration); see also Stephen Labaton, 'Silent Tort Reform' Is Overriding
States' Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at C5 ("Using a variety of largely unheralded
regulations, officials appointed by President Bush have moved in recent months to neuter
the states.").
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Appendix
The following is a list of all the cases that were included in
the study, sorted by subject matter, and presented in reverse
chronological order.
DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE LIMITS ON THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT
Commerce Clause
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
Guillen v. Pierce County, 537 U.S. 129 (2005)
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000)
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
Tenth Amendment
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000)
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988)
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985)
Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983)
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983)
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S.
678 (1982)
Spending Clause
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004)
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006)
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)
Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S.
743 (2002)
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001)
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
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Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
Eleventh Amendment
Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440
(2004)
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004)
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S.
613 (2002)
Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533
(2002)
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491
(1998)
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997)
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997)
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30
(1994)
P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993)
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Notak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991)
McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages &
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990)
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299
(1990)
Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96
(1989)
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989)
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989)
Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483
U.S. 468 (1987)
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986)
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985)
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)
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Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226
(1985)
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderma, 465 U.S.
89 (1984)
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983)
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982)
Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S.
670 (1982)
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496
(1982)
Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982)
Bankruptcy Clause
Cent. Va. Comm. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006)
DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE UNION-PRESERVING LIMITS ON THE
STATES
Preemption
Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
545 U.S. 440 (2005)
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431(2005)
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004)
Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.,
541 U.S. 246 (2004)
Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004)
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)
Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39
(2003)
Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003)
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S.
644 (2003)
Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329
(2003)
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002)
City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecking Serv.,
Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002)
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355
(2002)
Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534
U.S. 473 (2002)
Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235 (2002)
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Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)
Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001)
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341
(2001)
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363
(2000)
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)
Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000)
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999)
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S.
155 (1999)
Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997)
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997)
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997)
De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Found.,
520 U.S. 806 (1997)
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997)
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997)
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996)
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)
Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)
Yamaha Motor Corp., N.A., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S.
199 (1996)
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995)
N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995)
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995)
Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 (1995)
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995)
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995)
Neb. Dep't of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123
(1994)
Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea &
Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61 (1994)
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994)
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Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994)
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994)
Dep't of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332
(1994)
U.S. Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993)
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993)
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Assoc. Builders &
Contractors, 507 U.S. 218 (1993)
Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60
(1993)
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506
U.S. 125 (1992)
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992)
Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88
(1992)
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374
(1992)
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)
Wisc. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991)
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990)
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990)
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990)
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990)
California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990)
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990)
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362
(1990)
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163
(1989)
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989)
Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of
Kan., 489 U.S. 493 (1989)
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141 (1989)
Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19
(1988)
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354
(1988)
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)
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Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486
U.S. 825 (1988)
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399
(1988)
New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988)
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988)
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987)
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987)
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987)
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851
(1987)
Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (1987)
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69
(1987)
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)
Pilot Life Ins. Co v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)
Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572
(1987)
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. 202 (1987)
Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987)
324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987)
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272
(1987)
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S.
130 (1986)
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 478 U.S. 621 (1986)
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tellentire, 477 U.S. 207
(1986)
Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S.
1 (1986)
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S.
953 (1986)
Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reservation v.
Wold Eng'g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877 (1986)
Int'l Longshoremen's Assoc. v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380
(1986)
Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S.
608 (1986)
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986)
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Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v.
Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986)
Fisher v. Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986)
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd. of
Miss., 474 U.S. 409 (1986)
Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474
U.S. 494 (1986)
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724
(1985)
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.,
471 U.S. 707 (1985)
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226 (1985)
Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469
U.S. 256 (1985)
Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l
Union, 468 U.S. 491 (1984)
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)
Hayfield N. R.R. v. Chi. & N. W. Transp., 467 U.S. 622
(1984)
Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. &
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984)
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)
Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Dir. of Taxation of Haw., 464
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